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Abstract: 
The discourse between International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
and Islam has been a longstanding one. However, not all IHRL 
courses in Indonesia include Islamic human rights as one of the 
taught chapters. This normative research explores the urgency to 
include Islamic human rights in the IHRL curriculum, and finds 
that it is indeed urgent to do so. There are two reasons found to 
include Islamic human rights in IHRL. First, it becomes a counter 
towards the Eurocentric discourse of IHRL. Second, there are 
paradigmatic differences between IHRL and Islam which, if not 
understood, will make it difficult to fairly consider the discourse 
and analyze the derivative issues. There are two paradigmatic 
differences between IHRL and Islamic human rights, which are 
the epistemology and rights-obligation construction. 
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Abstrak: 
Diskursus antara Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia Internasional 
(HHAMI) dan Islam telah ada sejak lama dan hingga kini tidak 
habis-habis. Akan tetapi, ternyata tidak semua mata kuliah 
HHAMI yang diajarkan di fakultas-fakultas hukum Indonesia 
mencakupi HAM Islam sebagai salah satu pokok bahasan. 
Penelitian yang bersifat normatif ini akan mengkaji urgensi 
memasukkan konsep HAM Islam ke dalam kurikulum HHAMI, 
dan ditemukan bahwa hal tersebut memang memiliki urgensi. 
Ditemukan dua alasan utama untuk melakukan hal tersebut. 
Pertama, sebagai salah satu counter terhadap narasi eurosentrisme 
dalam diskursus HHAMI. Kedua, ternyata ada beberapa 
perbedaan yang bersifat paradigmatik antara HHAMI dan Islam, 
yang apabila tidak dikenal maka akan sulit mendudukkan 
diskursus HHAMI dan Islam dengan akurat apalagi mengkaji 
isu-isu turunan dengan tepat. Perbedaan paradigmatik ini ada 
dua, yaitu pada tatanan epistemologi serta konstruksi antara hak 
dan kewajiban.  
 
Kata Kunci: 
Konsep HAM Islam, Hak Asasi Manusia, Hukum Internasional, 
Indonesia 
 
 
Introduction 
There are so many discourses between international human 
rights law (hereinafter, IHRL) and Islam. There are so many fierce 
debates on this issue, and perhaps it can be agreed by all that there are 
matters of agreement and disagreements between IHRL and Islam.2 
There are differences not only in the detailed rights and application, 
but also at a paradigmatic level as this research will show.3 Therefore, 
                                                 
2 See inter alia: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Why Should Muslims Abandon Jihad? 
Human Rights and the Future of International Law,” Third World Quarterly 27, No. 5 
(2006): 785–97; Mashood A. Baderin, Hukum Internasional Hak Asasi Manusia Dan 
Hukum Islam (Jakarta: Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, 2010); Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer, “Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or Clash with a 
Construct,” Mich. J. Int’l L. 15 (1993): 307. 
3 The differences can go as deep as epistemology, as Islam and the Western-secular 
rooted human rights concept are worlds apart in this regard. Surely the derivative 
products (knowledge and rules) of the two would have differences which cannot be 
Incorporating the Islamic Concept of Rights 
al-Ihkâ  Vo l . 1 4  N o . 1  Ju ne  2 0 1 9  
DOI 10.19105/al-ihkam.v14i1.2166 
 
179  
it should be common sense to teach the Islamic concept of rights as 
one of the subjects in the teaching of IHRL in the world, and it should 
be more so in Islamic nations.4 
However, a short survey conducted by the Research Team 
reveals that the teaching of IHRL courses in a number of universities 
in Indonesia has little to do in Islamic rights content. How can a law 
graduate, understand, interpret, and apply Islamic laws or laws 
influenced by Islamic teachings without understanding or even 
knowing Islamic law theories? This is despite Islam being the second 
largest religion in the world,5 and Indonesia having the largest 
Muslim population in the world.6 In addition, the Indonesian legal 
system has some Islamic influence albeit not formally being an Islamic 
state. The making of the Pancasila as the state ideology and ‘source of 
all sources of law’ was very heavily influenced by Islamic teachings 
and the Muslims.7 
Some researches have addressed concern towards the issue 
mentioned above and also suggested prospects towards Islamization 
of knowledge.8 Those researches focus only on the Introduction to 
Jurisprudence course and only on particular chapters. As for the 
relation between IHRL and Islam, academic works mostly discuss 
                                                                                                                   
comprehended without first understanding the paradigmatic differences. This 
research goes deeper into this. Further reading on this difference of epistemology: 
Adian Husaini and Dinar Dewi Kania, eds., Filsafat Ilmu: Perspektif Barat dan Islam 
(Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2013). 
4 See for example, at the Ahmad Ibrahim Kuliyyah of Laws, International Islamic 
University of Malaysia, there is a course named “Fundamental Rights in Islam”. 
5Drew Desilver and David Masci, “World’s Muslim Population More Widespread 
than You Might Think,” Pew Research Center, 2017, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/31/worlds-muslim-population-
more-widespread-than-you-might-think/. 
6Desilver and Masci. 
7M. Saifullah Rohman, “Kandungan Nilai-Nilai Syariat Islam dalam Pancasila,” Jurnal 
Studi Agama Millah 13, No. 1 (2013): 209–11. 
8 See inter alia: Fajri Matahati Muhammadin and Hanindito Danusatya, “De-
Secularizing Legal Education in Indonesian Non-Islamic Law Schools: Examining The 
‘Introduction to Jurisprudence’ Textbooks On The ‘Norm Classification’ Chapter,” 
Ulul Albab: Jurnal Studi Dan Penelitian Hukum Islam 1, No. 2 (2018): 135–58. 
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prospect of reconciliating the two different.9 It is difficult to find 
researches addressing the urgency to apply Islamization of 
knowledge specifically in context of the teaching of IHRL. Therefore, 
this research brings forth something new by observing the need for 
Islamization of knowledge in the context of teaching IHRL.  
This research observes the urgency to incorporate the Islamic 
concept of rights into the IHRL courses in law schools. There are two 
major problems found, and it is these two problems which are 
discussed in this research: first, Islam’s relation with international law 
throughout the ages has been met with problems of ‘Eurocentrism’. 
Second, there are two paradigmatic differences between IHRL and the 
Islamic concept of rights, which are: epistemology (secular and non-
secular) and the construct of rights and responsibilities.  
These two problems are the focus of the discussion in this 
research, and it is found that they are essential to understand in order 
to objectively comprehend the discourse of IHRL and Islam. Likewise, 
it will be very difficult to understand the discourse of IHRL and Islam 
without introducing the Islamic concept of rights, especially at the 
paradigmatic level, in the IHRL courses. 
 
Research Method 
This research is mainly a doctrinal legal research which 
analyses legal principles, doctrines, and theories and their relevance 
towards the teaching of IHRL. Two approaches will be combined, i.e. 
post-colonial theories in critical international law especially as argued 
by Antony Anghie, and the Islamic worldview as developed by Syed 
Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas. A literature review is conducted 
primarily using information and data obtained from books, articles, 
researches, and the primary, secondary, and tertiary sources of law of 
both international law and Islamic law. 
 
Analysis 
Islam, Islamic Law, and International Law 
Unlike the secular understanding of what ‘religion’ means and 
encompasses, Islam is an Al-dîn whose meaning includes ‘judicious 
                                                 
9 See inter alia: Mashood A Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Baderin’s work juxtaposes the rights in IHRL 
and Islam, and suggests possible ways to reconcile the differences. 
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power’.10 The Islamic legal system itself has the Al-Qur’ân and 
Sunnah as primary sources, and matters not specifically and explicitly 
regulated in those primary sources will be derived from those 
primary sources through ijtihâd.11  
 
Islam and International Law  
One of the branches of Islamic law (fiqh) regulates the conduct 
of the Islamic nation with other nations, namely fiqh al-siyar (known 
also as the ‘Islamic international law’).12 This branch of fiqh recognizes 
agreements and customary laws as source as law as long as they do 
not contradict the primary sources.13 Fiqh al-siyar has historically 
contributed positively in the development of the norms of 
international law.14 In fact, there are claims that the first charter of 
rights in the world is the Madinah Charter.15 In this age, there is still a 
little role for Islamic law in modern international law, such as the use 
of Islamic law rules or maxims by the judges of the International 
Court of Justice.16  
                                                 
10 Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon: In Eight Parts, Vol. 3 (Bayrūt: 
Librairie du Liban, 1968), 942–47. For a detailed comparison between the Islamic 
notion of ‘religion’ and the secular one, see: Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Islam 
and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993); Zara Khan, “Refractions Through the 
Secular: Islam, Human Rights, and Universality” (The City University of New York, 
2016). 
11Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (Selangor: The Other Press, 2003), 
20; Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī, vol. 1 (Tehran: Dar Ihsan, 1997), 19; 
‘Abd al-Karim Zaydan, Synopsis on the Elucidation of Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, trans. 
Md. Habibur Rahman and Azman Ismail (Kuala Lumpur: IBFIM, 2015), 29. 
12Imam Al-Shaybānī, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar, trans. Majid 
Khadduri (Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 5–6. 
13 Al-Shaybānī, 8.  
14Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: 
Henry Dunant Institute, 1985), 15–17; Nahed Samour, “Is There a Role for Islamic 
International Law in the History of International Law?,” European Journal of 
International Law 25, no. 1 (2014): 313–19. 
15Badria Al-Awadhi, “Address by the Dean of the Faculty of Law and Shari`a in the 
University of Kuwait,” in Human Rights in Islam (Geneva: International Commission 
of Jurists, 1982), 28. 
16Awn S. Al-Khasawneh, “Islam and International Law,” in Islam and International 
Law: Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspectives, ed. Marie-Luisa Frick and 
Andreas Th Müller (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 34–41. 
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Additionally, there are numerous human rights treaties 
ratified by Muslim nations which also submitted reservations on the 
basis of Islamic law.17 The practice of these Islamic nations which 
diverge from the other nations may be recognized as a persistent 
objection which creates an exception from the development of the 
customary international law18 of human rights. This is in addition to 
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990). However, 
there are various challenges and problems which diminishe the role of 
Islam in international law. Some scholars suggest that it is partly due 
to the failure of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to take lead,19 
while others point their fingers towards the crisis of knowledge 
within the Islamic community itself.20  
 
‘Eurocentrism’ as an External Problem 
Scholars do not seem to deny that modern international law is 
of European origin. Some of these scholars accept this without 
questioning further,21 but other scholars and thinkers, especially those 
using the post-colonial theory, are more critical and point out that 
there have been injustices throughout history which need to be 
corrected.  
These thinkers have traced back this problem to medieval 
Europe during the rise of the natural law school of Fransisco De 
Vitoria who justified colonialism as the center of international law at 
the time: the ‘civilized nations’ (i.e. the European nations) must 
                                                 
17 The examples are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR) and Convention on the Elimination on all forms of Discrimination against 
Women 1979 (CEDAW) where some Islamic states were engaged.  
18Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 6th ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 91–93. There is a debate on the ‘other states’ approval’ requirement in this. 
19 See inter alia: Salim Farrar, “The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation: Forever on 
the Periphery of Public International Law?,” Chinese Journal of International Law 13, no. 
4 (2014): 787–817. 
20 See inter alia: Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Risalah Untuk Kaum Muslimin 
(Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2001). 
21 Sugeng Istanto, Hukum Internasional (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Universitas Atmajaya 
Yogyakarta, 1994), 9–10. 
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‘civilize the uncivilized nations’ (i.e. other than the European 
nations).22 
In that global colonial era, the colonial powers have made 
various efforts to eradicate the practice of Islamic law in their colonies. 
For example, in the part of Nusantara (which is now Indonesia), well 
established and pre-existing adat and Islamic courts were abolished 
and replaced by the Dutch law courts.23 It was only after 
independence that Islam could become an important element in the 
system of governance in Indonesia,24 and this was even only to a few 
matters. This was how a ‘Eurocentric’ international law was formed, 
and then preserved through the era of legal positivism.25 It was even 
further preserved throughout the post-World War II decolonialization 
period,26 and continues to this day where the European (more referred 
to as ‘Western’) worldview becomes the measure of truth and 
correctness by the mere virtue of being Western.27  
                                                 
22Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 251. This train of thought was adopted by 
other scholars in that era including those dubbed as ‘fathers of international law’ such 
as Emer de Vattel. De Vattel justified the conquest over the natives of North America 
because these natives were nomadic, while the ‘natural law’ (according to the 
Europeans) demands the permanent cultivation of the lands. See: Emer De Vattel and 
Joseph Chitty, The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (PH Nicklin & T. Johnson, 1835), 35. 
23Ramlah, “Implikasi Pengaruh Politik Hukum Kolonial Belanda Terhadap Badan 
Peradilan Agama Di Indonesia,” Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam 12, No. 1 (2012): 386–90. 
24 As explained earlier, even the Pancasila as state ideology was heavily influenced by 
Islam and the Muslims. See: Rohman, “Kandungan Nilai-Nilai Syariat Islam dalam 
Pancasila”; Marybeth T. Acac, “Pancasila: A Contemporary Application of Maqasid 
Al-Shari‘ah?,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 9, no. 1 (2015): 59–78. 
25 Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, “Universalitas Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Hukum 
Internasional: Sebuah Pendekatan Post-Kolonial,” in Hak Asasi Manusia: Dialektika 
Universalisme vs Relativisme di Indonesia, ed. Al-Khanif, Herlambang P. Wiratraman, 
and Manunggal Kusuma Wardaya (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2017), 7; John Austin, The 
Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1832), 1–2. 
26Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, 254; Antony 
Anghie, “Towards a Postcolonial International Law,” in Critical International Law: 
Post-Realism, Post Colonialism, and Transnationalism, ed. Prabakhar Singh and Benoit 
Mayer (Oxford–New Dheli, 2014), 136–37. 
27 Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, Islamization of Contemporary Knowledge and the Role of the 
University in the Context of De-Westernization and Decolonialization (Johor Baru: UTM 
Press, 2013), 6–7. 
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Examples to this include the imposition of the Western human 
rights standards of good governance at the World Bank,28 strange and 
ill-justified UN reports issued by the Committee Against Torture and 
UN Rapporteurs regarding lashing as penalty,29 the European Union 
policy on investments which requires the investee state to apply EU-
style human rights as prequisit to investments,30 the imposition of 
Western-secular gender equality standards in CEDAW (Convention 
on the Elimination on all forms of Discrimination against Women),31 
and many others. This is the unjust imposition of Western worldview 
and its products as a universal standard,32 also referred to as 
‘Eurocentrism’. 
 
Traces of Eurocentrism in Law School Education 
It has been explained earlier how Islamic law in Indonesia has 
been heavily reduced due to colonialism. This heavily impacts 
education. For many years and decades, Islamic law was made alien 
to law students (including the Muslim students) except the few parts 
of it which had already been codified to the Indonesian national 
legislation. In fact, a survey has been conducted towards the law 
students (Muslims only) of one of the best law schools in Indonesia. 
One hundred percent of the respondents did not know any basic of al-
qawâ‘id al-fiqhiyyah, but they all recognized the latin legal maxims 
which have the same meaning with the basic al-qawâ‘id al-fiqhiyyah 
asked to them.33 
                                                 
28 The primary victims were the Latin American States. See: Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, 261–62. 
29 Fajri Matahati Muhammadin et al., “Lashing in Qanun Aceh and the Convention 
Against Torture,” Malaysian Journal of Syariah and Law 7, no. 1 (2019): 18–20.  
30Lorand Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in 
Trade and Investment Agreements,” 2014, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/86031/Study.pdf. 
31 Muhammadin, “Universalitas Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Hukum Internasional: 
Sebuah Pendekatan Post-Kolonial,” 12, 13, and 16. 
32 In fact, it is not universal. See: Muhammadin, “Universalitas Hak Asasi Manusia 
Dalam Hukum Internasional: Sebuah Pendekatan Post-Kolonial.” 
33 Vina Berliana Kimberly, Novita Dwi Lestari, and Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, 
“Incorporating Qawaidh Fiqhiyyah to the ‘Principles of Law’ Chapter in the 
Introduction to Jurisprudence Course in Indonesia’s Legal Education,” in International 
Conference on Research in Islamic Education 2018 Conference Proceeding, Fakulti Tamadun 
Islam, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Springer, 2019), (upcoming). 
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From the most fundamental aspects, the concept of religion as 
a norm is taught to display as if it is disconnected to other aspects of 
life. In the Introduction to Jurisprudence course, for example, most 
textbooks explain that ‘religious norms’ is a separate norm from the 
others such as legal norms, ethical/moral norms, and social norms 
(although they may complement each other).34 In fact, religious norms 
are said to be: (i) only regulating human-God relations, and (ii) has 
weaknesses because it only prescribes obligations and does not have 
worldly sanctions.35 On the other hand, Islam, as explained earlier, is 
not at all like that.36 
Because of that, all courses with traces of Eurocentrism, 
including IHRL, must be critically reviewed and renewed. Otherwise, 
these courses will do nothing but preserve and continue the 
intellectual legacies of colonialism. It must be noted that the Preamble 
of the Indonesian constitution in its first line reads “...penjajahan di atas 
dunia harus dihapuskan.”37 Law students must be aware of a broader 
extent of the IHRL discourses. Particularly in the discussion of this 
research, the Islamic concept of rights must be introduced as it is not 
only a very contemporary discourse but also because it is very close to 
the identity of the Indonesian people which was once eroded by 
colonialism.  
 
Islam, Islamic Epistemology, and Its Implications 
An undeniable reality of the human rights concept in 
international law (i.e. IHRL) is its secular concept.38 This is despite 
some states which ratify the IHRL instruments are not secular states 
and implement the instruments in a non-secular manner (insofar as 
                                                 
34Sudikno Mertokusumo, Mengenal Hukum (Suatu Pengantar), 3rd ed. (Yogyakarta: 
Liberty, 1991), 5–12; Peter Mahmud Marzuki, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum (Jakarta: 
Prenadamedia Group, 2008), 79–83; Satjipto Rahardjo, Ilmu Hukum (Bandung: Citra 
Aditya Bhakti, 1991), 26. 
35Mertokusumo, Mengenal Hukum (Suatu Pengantar), 9–10. 
36 See further: Muhammadin and Danusatya, “De-Secularizing Legal Education in 
Indonesian Non-Islamic Law Schools: Examining The ‘Introduction to Jurisprudence’ 
Textbooks On The ‘Norm Classification’ Chapter”; Khan, “Refractions Through the 
Secular: Islam, Human Rights, and Universality.” 
37 Loosely translated: “… colonialism must be eradicated from the face of the earth.” 
38Michael Freeman, “The Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2004): 399. 
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they can do so).39 The problem is that the distinction between a 
secular and non-secular worldview is often understood only at the 
surface. This is while the differences between the two are very 
fundamental, and the failure to understand it would render students 
unable to properly and objectively understand derivative issues. 
The first thing to understand is that the term ‘secular’ is 
fundamentally a worldview of reality as explained by C. A. van 
Peursen: “…deliverance first from religious, and then from metaphysical, 
control over human reason and language.”40 Secularism is then derived 
into the disenchantment of nature, desacralization of politics, and 
deconsecration of values.41 
Secularism then affects epistemology, especially on the sources 
of knowledge. The human mind’s ratio becomes the only criteria of 
truth and source of knowledge,42 while metaphysical realities have 
neither relevance nor epistemological value based.43 One of the effects 
is the promulgation of secular-derived theories such as August 
Comte’s Law of Three Stages which assumes that a man taking 
knowledge from religion is the most primordial stage of man, while a 
man taking knowledge from scientific inquiry is the modern (and 
most advanced) man.44  
On the other hand, Islam is very different. The first time the al-
Qur’ân mentions taqwâ, it is in the form of muttaqîn (‘people of 
taqwâ‘).45 That mention is followed by a list of characteristics of the 
muttaqîn, and the very first characteristic is ‘to believe in the ghayb’.46 
                                                 
39For example: Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and others.  
40Cited in: Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological 
Perspective (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 2. 
41Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 18. 
42Adnin Armas and Dinar Dewi Kania, “Sekulerisasi Ilmu,” in Filsafat Ilmu: Perspektif 
Barat Dan Islam, ed. Adian Husaini and Dinar Dewi Kania (Jakarta: Gema Insani 
Press, 2013), 7. 
43Justus Harnack, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan Publisher, 1968), 
142–45. 
44Auguste Comte, “Plan of the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f 
Society,” in Comte: Early Political Writings, ed. H.S. Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 81. 
45 Taqwā means the consciousness of Allah. 
46 Ghayb means ‘the unseen’, referring to things that exist in a metaphysical but not a 
physical materialistic plane. See Q.S al-Baqarah 2 :2-3, especially verse 3 where the 
characteristics of the ‘people of taqwā’ are mentioned. 
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How can someone believe in metaphysical realities without making 
them a source of knowledge? This is why the Islamic epistemology 
puts khabar sâdiq (which includes divine revelation) as one of the 
causes of knowledge other than ratio, senses, and intuition.47 This is 
where the secular and Islamic epistemology clashes. 
Some scholars such as Helen Quane merely demands that 
secular international law must take precedence over religious 
teachings when they contradict each others.48 Meanwhile, one cannot 
simply put man-made laws over God-made laws unless they have by 
default applied a secular framework which sees anything ‘religious’ 
as primordial as per Comte’s theory. Quane simply dismisses the 
Islamic epistemology without any mention of it and bases her entire 
case on a secular view. 
On the other hand, putting Islamic laws below other laws is 
one of the nullifiers of Islam.49 Even the Pancasila, considering what 
the first sila says, cannot accept Quane’s argument. However, it may 
seem that Quane’s position represents the mainstream scholarship. 
Therefore, secular thinkers would not recognize the epistemological 
problem behind this train of thought and therefore unable to address 
the issue objectively and correctly. 
 
Case Study: Religious Blasphemy 
One of the most concrete case studies to best illustrate the 
significant difference between both epistemologies is the 
criminalization of religious blasphemy. On one hand, the position of 
IHRL is clear. Various bodies under the UN have stated that the 
criminalization of religious blasphemy is a violation of the freedom of 
expression.50 On the other hand, Islam clearly supports the 
                                                 
47 Sa’d al-Din Al-Taftazani, A Commentary on the Creed of Islam (Sa’d Al-Din Al-
Taftazani on the Creed of Najm Al-Din Al-Nasafi) (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1950), 15–17. 
48 Helen Quane, “Legal Pluralism and International Human Rights Law: Inherently 
Incompatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between?,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 33, No. 4 (2013): 675. 
49Committing a nullifier of Islam would render a Muslim no longer within the fold of 
Islam. Shalih bin Fauzan Al-Fauzan, Syarah Nawaaqidhul Islam (Jakarta: Akbar Media, 
2017), 122–40. 
50 OHCHR, “Blasphemy Law Has No Place in a Tolerant Nation like Indonesia – UN 
Rights Experts,” Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, May 22, 2017, 
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criminalization of religious blasphemy. In fact, there is a consensus 
among the classical Muslim jurists that religious blasphemy is 
punishable by death.51 Behind both of these different positions are 
significant epistemological differences.  
The secular IHRL position sees no virtue in criminalizing 
religious blasphemy. This is because inter alia most major textbooks 
explain its ‘benefit’ as a purpose of law with Jeremy Bentham’s 
utilitarianism.52 John Stuart Mill, Bentham’s student, stated that 
punishments should only be applied only to prevent material danger 
or loss towards other members of the society (as opposed to moral 
infringement).53 Bentham is clearly secular, and Mill clearly accepts 
Comte’s Law of Three Stages.54 Surely they do not consider 
metaphysical danger or loss such as in context of aqîdah.55  
On the other hand, Islam sees it differently. The purpose of the 
syarî‘ah (maqâṣhid al-syarî`ah) is to achieve maṣlaḥat both in this world 
and the hereafter.56 Maṣlaḥat is therefore divided into the hereafter’s 
maṣlaḥat dan the worldy maṣlaḥat.57 The hereafter’s maṣlaḥat truly takes 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21646
&LangID=E; HRC, “General Comments No. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34)” (Geneva, 2011), 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf.  
51Imam ibn Al-Mundzir Al-Naysaburi, Al-Ijma (Saudi Arabia: Maktabah Al-Furqan, 
1999), 174.  
52 Sudikno Mertokusumo, Mengenal Hukum: Suatu Pengantar (Yogyakarta: Liberty 
Press, 2006), 80; Marzuki, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum, 119; Achmad Ali, Menguak Tabir 
Hukum, 2nd Editio (Jakarta: Penerbit Kencana, 2015), 92–95. 
53John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence, Second Edi (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 3. 
54James E. Crimmins, “Bentham on Religion: Atheism and the Secular Society,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 47, no. 1 (1986): 95–110; Sujith Shashi Kumar, 
“Reassessing JS Mill’s Liberalism: The Influence of Auguste Comte, Jeremy Bentham, 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt.” (London School of Economics and Political Science 
(United Kingdom), 2006), 62. 
55 Further discussions regarding utilitarianism and maqāṣid al-syarī`ah: Nurizal Ismail, 
Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, and Hanindito Danusatya, “The Urgency to 
Incorporate Maqasid Shari’ah as an Eludication of ‘Benefit’ as a Purpose of Law in 
Indonesia’s Legal Education,” in 1st International Conference on Law, Technology, and 
Society (ICOLESS) 2018 (Malang: Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim, 
2019). 
56Imam Ibn Ashur, Treatise on Maqasid Al-Shariah (London: IIIT, 2006), 71. 
57Imam Al-Ghazali, Shifa’al-Ghalil Fi Bayan Al-Syabah Wa Al-Mukhil Wa Masalik Al-
Ta’lil (Baghdad: Mathba’ah al-Irsyad, 1971), 159–61. 
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precedence over the worldy maṣlaḥat,58 because Islam sees this world 
as a mere means to achieve the hereafter59 and heaven is the best 
destination in that hereafter.60  
One of the subjects under maṣlaḥat, the hifdz al-dîn 
(preservation of belief, meaning towards Islam) is the glorification of 
Allah, His dîn, and his messengers (i.e. prophets).61 Blasphemy 
violates that very fundamental and basic aspect of Islam,62 and 
Muslims commiting it are considered no longer in the fold of Islam 
and therefore the laws related to apostasy (riddah) would apply 
towards them.63 
It is therefore clear that IHRL which is based on secular-based 
jurisprudence and thought cannot accept the criminalization of 
religious blasphemy, while Islam can. Which epistemology should 
one choose? This is not a difficult choice for a Muslim studying law in 
a state based upon the Pancasila as state ideology. Surely this can be 
debated further. However, if this difference is not even introduced in 
the classrooms, students will not be able to objectively and accurately 
comprehend problems rising from these epistemological differences 
between IHRL and Islam. Consequently, they will be unable to make 
proper and coherent conclusions when analyzing those problems.  
It is understood that this discussion seems more of a 
philosophical discussion rather than that of law. However, 
multidisciplinary approaches in legal education (or the education any 
field, really) is an inevitability.64 
 
The Concept of ‘Human Obligations’ in Islam 
                                                 
58Al-Ghazali, 159; Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence, 204–6. 
59Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyah, ’Uddatush Shabirin (Jakarta: Qisthi Press, 2010), 
264. 
60 See inter alia: Q.S Ali Imron 3:185. 
61‘Abd al-Raḥmān Al-Sa‘di, Taysiru Al-Karīma Al-Raḥmān Fī Tafsīri Kalāmi Al-Mannān 
(Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 2002), 357.  
62Al-Sa‘di, 357. See also: Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyah, Al-Jawāb Al-Kāfī (Al-
Maghrib: Dar al-Ma’rifah, 1997), 46. 
63 See: Q.S al-Tawbah, 9:65-66. See also: Imam Muhammad bin ’Abd al-Wahhab, 
Nawaqidhul Islam - Pembatal Islam (Matan Dan Terjemah) (Surabaya: Pustaka Syabab, 
2015), 164–83.  
64See: Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, “Pendidikan Hukum Di Indonesia: Penjelasan 
tentang Kurikulum 1993,” Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan 6, no. 1994 (1994): 498–99. 
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In the realm of IHRL, the term ‘right’ (means ‘entitlement’) is 
often mentioned as a recurring theme. On the other hand, the term 
‘obligation’ is rarely mentioned rather than ‘obligation to 
respect/guarantee rights’. It means that the highest rule in IHRL is 
‘rights’. Islam is different in this respect, and this difference has 
paradigmatic implications. 
IHRL is constructed to be heavily lean towards rights. One of 
the factors is that it was historically a regime born out of the 
extremely massive violation of human rights during World Wars I 
and II.65 However, this absence of ‘human obligations’ to balance the 
‘human rights’ was one of the main critics of the Indonesian Council 
of Ulema towards international human rights.66 This problem is also a 
deviation from the pattern of balance between rights and obligations 
in legal education. For example, law students are taught in their first 
semester about the relation between ‘law, rights, and obligations’.67 
Even, Law No. 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights actually 
prescribes Kewajiban Dasar Manusia (i.e. human fundamental 
obligations).68  
If two different regimes have different constructions of 
balancing rights and obligations, surely there would be very different 
understandings of what ‘rights’ mean and how they are perceived. As 
consequence, the detailed enumeration of rights would surely have 
different meanings between the two different regimes altogether. This 
is the case with IHRL and Islam.  
Islam, contrast to IHRL, provides both rights and obligations 
though somewhat inclining towards obligations. From the most 
fundamental nature of a human being, humans are created with the 
obligation –not rights—to worship Allah as explained in Q.S al-
Dzâriyât 51:56: “And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to 
worship Me.”  
                                                 
65Shaw, International Law, 271. 
66“Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia No. 6/MUNAS VI/MUI/2000 Tentang Hak Asasi 
Manusia” (Jakarta, 2000), 381, https://mui.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/26.-
Hak-hak-Asasi-Manusia-HAM.pdf. 
67Mertokusumo, Mengenal Hukum (Suatu Pengantar), 38–46. 
68Articles 67-70 of Law No. 39. of 1999 concerning Human Rights: Obeying the law, 
defending the state, and respecting the human rights of other people. 
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Only then that Allah decrees that humans have rights as He is 
al-Raḥmân which means The Most Compassionate and Merciful 
towards all creation without exception69 and has prohibited dzulm (the 
violation of rights) upon Himself and all creation.70 This is why, as 
argued by Shamrahayu bt. Abdul Aziz, Islam is essentially duty-
based.71 This difference with IHRL would create paradigmatic 
differences towards derivative issues which, if not understood, would 
result in misunderstanding.  
 
Case Study on Derivative Issues 
Among the differences between IHRL and Islam due to the 
difference in construction of rights and obligations is related to 
knowledge and education. IHRL, through Article 13(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966 
(ICESCR), prescribe a right to education. 
On the other hand, in Islam, to receive education is not a right 
but rather an obligation.72 Islamic jurists divide knowledge in two 
types: first, knowledge which is obligatory to be learned by everyone 
(farḍ al-‘ayn) such as the knowledge of tawḥîd and basic fiqh;73 and 
second, knowledge which is obligatory to some people (farḍ al-kifâyah) 
due to a collective necessity of it within the community, such as 
medical science.74  
The Islamic state has obligations to inter alia implement and 
enforce the syarî‘ah (which contains rights and obligations),75 which 
includes to provide education in order to facilitate the society’s need 
                                                 
69Imam Ismail ibn Katsir, Tafsir Al-Qur’an Al-Adzim, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub 
’Ilmiya, 1998), 39. 
70Imam Muslim, Sahih Muslim (Riyadh: Bait Al-Afkar Ad-Dauliyyah, 1998), ḥadīts no 
.2577. Imam An-Nawawi and Muhammad bin Shalih Al-Utsaimin, Syarah Hadits 
Arba’in Imam Nawawi (Yogyakarta: Media Hidayah, 2006), 195. 
71Shamrahayu binti Abdul Aziz, “Islamic Concept of Human Rights,” in Human 
Rights Law: International, Malaysian and Islamic Perspectives, ed. Abdul Ghafur Hamid 
@ Khin Maung Sein (Selangor: Thomson Reuters Malaysia Sdn Bhd, 2012), 329. 
72 See inter alia: QS. Taha 20: 114, QS. Al-Nahl 16: 78, QS. Muhammad 47: 19, and see 
also: Imām Al-Ghazāli, Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm Al-Dīn, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub ’Ilmiya, 1971), 
14. 
73Al-Ghazāli, 1:14.  
74Al-Ghazāli, 1:15–16. 
75Musthafa Al-Khin and Musthafa Al-Bugha, Konsep Kepemimpinan dan Jihad dalam 
Islam: Menurut Madzhab Syafi’i (Jakarta: Darul Haq, 2014), 110–11.  
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to fulfil their obligation to receive education. This would also mean 
that the society would then also have rights to be guaranteed to 
receive education by the Islamic State so that they can fulfil their 
obligation as explained earlier. From here, more derivative issues may 
follow, such as whether someone may choose to be uneducated 
(IHRL: yes, Islam: no), and many more. 
A second derivative issue resulted from the different 
construction in rights and obligations, which is very central, is the 
issue of religion and worship. On one hand, the ICCPR in articles 
18(1)-(2) rules that every human being has a freedom to choose their 
religion and manifest them in acts of worship, and that they may not 
be forced in a manner that would distrupt that freedom. Here, the role 
of the government is to guarantee that such freedom is enjoyed by 
their people. Islam sees the issue very differently. As explained 
earlier, to worship Allah is essentially an obligation (instead of a right) 
towards all jinn and human beings as per Q.S al-Dzâriyât 51:56. In 
addition, Islam only recognizes one religion (i.e. Islam) as the true 
religion as per Q.S Ali Imrân 3:19: “Indeed, the religion in the sight of 
Allah is Islam.” 
As a side note, it is important to note that the consequence of 
the obligation to worship Allah in the Islamic terms does not mean 
that Muslims may coerce non-Muslims to accept Islam.76 Rather, it is 
understood to mean that Muslims must conduct da‘wah (propagation, 
preaching) with good arguments and in the best of manners.77 If a 
non-Muslim refuses to accept Islam until the end of her/his life, it 
would be their personal business with Allah.78  
The differences of construction between IHRL and Islam 
regarding religion and worship, which is a right according to IHRL 
and an obligation according to Islam, causes a complex relation 
between the two. At times, IHRL and Islam can agree on certain 
issues. For example, the Human Rights Committee declared that the 
                                                 
76See: QS. Al-Baqarah 2: 256, and: Haji Abdulmalik Abdulkarim Amrullah, Tafsir Al-
Azhar, vol. 1 (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional PTE Ltd, n.d.), 623–24. 
77 Haji Abdulmalik Abdulkarim Amrullah, Tafsir Al-Azhar, Vol. 5 (Singapore: Pustaka 
Nasional PTE Ltd, n.d.), 3989–90. 
78 I.e. to receive punishment in the hereafter. See: QS. Al-Kahf 18:29, also see: Haji 
Abdulmalik Abdulkarim Amrullah, Tafsir Al-Azhar, Vol. 6 (Singapore: Pustaka 
Nasional PTE Ltd, n.d.), 4191. 
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ḥijâb (or khimâr, referring to the headscarf worn by Muslim women) 
prohibition in Uzbekistan was a violation of human rights.79 The 
Muslims would surely support the condemnation towards that 
Uzbekistan policy. However, there are times when disagreements and 
misunderstandings occur between IHRL and Islam. An example to 
this is Ann Elizabeth Mayer’s critic towards the imposition of ḥijâb in 
Saudi Arabia.80  
According to Mayer, Saudi’s policy is not an Islamic teaching 
but rather a mere political maneuver. In her explanation, it is clear 
that Mayer sees that for Muslim women, to wear the ḥijâb is a right 
(which may or may not be exercised, at the discretion of the 
individuals), while the government should have only taken the role as 
guarantor of rights.81 However, in Islam, wearing a ḥijâb is obligatory 
for grown up women.82 As explained earlier, the duty of an Islamic 
state is to implement and enforce the syarî‘ah which is duty-based. 
This is different from an IHRL construct, where Mayer seems to 
misunderstand and therefore ends up with an inaccurate conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been explained in this research that a Eurocentric 
teaching of IHRL is not only lack objectiveness and accuracy but also 
contradicts the spirit of Indonesia’s independence and legal system. 
However, the Islamic concept of rights, which seems closer to 
Indonesia’s society and legal system due to its Islamic influence and 
socio-historical background, is instead more alien to the Indonesian 
law students. Meanwhile, it has also been shown that there are some 
paradigmatic differences between IHRL and the Islamic concept of 
rights which, if not understood, will cause much misunderstanding. It 
is difficult to truly understand religion-related issues such as deviant 
sects or religious blasphemy if one analyzes the relevant Islamic laws 
but using a secular epistemology. 
                                                 
79 UN Human Rights Committee, Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, 
CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000, para. 6.2. 
80Mayer, “Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or Clash with 
a Construct,” 393–97. 
81Mayer, 402–3. 
82 Except in front of their immediate family. Imam ibn Ḥazm, Marātib Al-Ijmā‘ (Beirut: 
Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.d.).  
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In addition, failing to understand the difference in 
construction of rights and obligations (i.e. IHRL focusing on rights, 
and Islam focusing on both but leaning towards obligations) would 
also lead to misunderstanding and confusion in derivative issues as 
explained in the previous sub-section. Therefore, it is essential to 
incorporate the Islamic concept of rights in the curriculum of the 
IHRL course in Indonesian law schools. More importantly, the 
syllabus must emphasize on the identification and understanding of 
the paradigmatic differences between IHRL and the Islamic concept of 
rights. This is hoped to help facilitate the students to be able to study 
and analyze issues related to IHRL and Islam more objectively and 
accurately.  
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